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I. INTRODUCTION
High school can be a challenging time for many teenagers. They are faced with
the challenge of developing into independent young adults, while being subjected to
constant authoritative control and scrutiny. Teenagers are even subject to
authoritative supervision outside of the home by such figures as schoolteachers,
guidance counselors, athletic coaches, and student group advisors. In many cases,
229

230

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 18:229

these adult authority figures are in a relationship of trust and confidence with the
students, often to a degree where the adult is seen as a surrogate parent or role
model.
In such relationships, how would most students react if asked by these authority
figures to submit to a suspicionless1 drug test? Would the students feel that someone
they trust and admire is accusing them of wrongdoing, and feel that they must
vindicate themselves by passing the test?2 Would the students be afraid to assert
their right not to take the test out of fear of being seen as deceptive?
In an effort to battle adolescent drug use, many school districts have implemented
drug-testing programs that focus on certain groups of students without any
particularized suspicion of drug use by any of the individual students. Schools
obtain consent to these programs by conditioning participation in certain activities on
passing the drug test. For example, many schools condition participation in
interscholastic athletics on passing a drug test.3 Some schools also condition
participation in any competitive, interscholastic activity, such as band or choir, on
passing a drug test.4
Although the Supreme Court of the United States5 has specifically addressed and
upheld these latter examples,6 schools have implemented drug-testing programs in
other contexts as well. For example, Groveport Madison, a public high school in
Groveport, Ohio, recently adopted a policy that requires all students applying for an
on-campus parking permit to pass an initial drug test, and to also submit to a monthly
random drawing of students to be tested.7 This program requires students to pay an

1

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) defines suspicion as “the apprehension or
imagination of the existence of something wrong based only on inconclusive or slight
evidence, or possibly even no evidence.” Therefore, public school drug-testing programs are
referred to as suspicionless because they are preventive in nature; they do not focus on
individual students based on any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing. Instead, they focus
on a large group of students, such as athletes, and test for multiple illicit drugs and alcohol in
order to deter drug use before it even begins.
2

FATEMA GUNJA, ALEXANDRA COX, MARSHA ROSENBAUM, PHD & JUDITH APPEL, J.D.,
MAKING SENSE OF STUDENT DRUG TESTING: WHY EDUCATORS ARE SAYING NO (2004)
available at http://www.drugtesting-fails.org/pdf/drug-testing-booklet.pdf. This publication
argues that student-teacher relationships can be undermined when teachers or coaches “act as
confidants in some circumstances, but as police in others,” which may circumvent trust and
cause students to feel “ashamed and resentful.” Id. at 8.
3

See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).

4

See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).

5

Hereinafter referred to as “Supreme Court.”

6

See Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646; Earls, 536 U.S. 822. The balancing test established by the
Supreme Court to determine the legality of a particular school’s drug-testing program will be
discussed under Section II: Case-Law Background.
7
Bill Bush, Groveport Madison; Students Must Pass Drug Test to Park, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Aug. 28, 2004, at 1A; Mike Harden, Principal Takes Wrong Turn in Instituting
Drug-Test Rule, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 31, 2004, at 1B [hereinafter Harden, Drug-Test
Rule]; Mike Harden, Parking Policy Doesn’t Deserve Bad Reputation, Principal Says,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 5, 2004, at 1B [hereinafter Harden, Parking Policy].
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annual fee of $26, and has been attributed with causing the number of students
applying for on-campus parking permits to decrease by 25% from the previous year.8
The school’s first random test yielded three positive results for marijuana out of 37
samples.9 Students who fail the test are punished with a three-week suspension of
parking privileges and are required to undergo counseling.10
The Groveport Madison program has produced mixed feelings among the local
community. Columbus Dispatch reporter Mike Harden quoted Groveport Madison
Principal Mike Beck as saying that, early in the program’s existence, he estimated
parental support for the program as being “70-30 for.”11 However, the program has
upset at least one parent. Ken Dustheimer, whose daughter attended Groveport
Madison at the time, lodged a complaint concerning the program’s legality with the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio.12 Although the ACLU of Ohio
has not taken any formal legal action regarding the program, Gary Daniels,
Litigation Coordinator and spokesman for the ACLU of Ohio, stated that “[the
program] definitely raises constitutional concerns.”13
This note will address the concerns raised by suspicionless drug-testing programs
in public high schools by ultimately arguing that public policy considerations should
be factored into the Supreme Court’s balancing test,14 and that such considerations
will weigh the balance against expanding drug-testing programs to contexts beyond
those already upheld by the Supreme Court.15 At the least, this note will argue that
the Groveport Madison drug-testing program, imposed on students applying for oncampus parking privileges, should not be upheld. However, before this argument
can be properly asserted, a number of pertinent topics must be discussed.
Section II of this note will begin by discussing the primary Supreme Court
cases16 that address certain legal issues relevant to drug-testing programs.17 This
8

Bush, supra note 7.

9

Harden, Parking Policy, supra note 7.

10

Bush, supra note 7; Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7.

11

Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7.

12

Harden, Parking Policy, supra note 7.

13

Bush, supra note 7; Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7.

14

As previously stated, the Supreme Court’s balancing test, which is used to determine the
legality of public high school drug-testing programs, will be fully discussed under Section II:
Case-Law Background, infra.
15
The contexts already considered and upheld by the Supreme Court involve programs
imposed on interscholastic athletics and competitive extra-curricular activities. See generally
Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646; Earls, 536 U.S. 822.
16
This note focuses only on federal case law developed by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Individual states retain the authority to impose their own guidelines, provided
they do not conflict with the guidelines established by the Supreme Court. In doing so, states
are allowed to be more expansive of individual rights, and can provide greater restrictions on
school drug-testing programs than what federal case law does. See GUNJA et al., supra note 2,
at 11.
17
Such legal issues include: 1) whether the protections afforded in the Bill of Rights apply
to public high school students; 2) whether a drug test conducted via urinalysis constitutes a
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section will also discuss the cases specifically addressing drug-testing programs,
including those implemented by public high schools.18 Section III of this note will
apply the Supreme Court’s balancing test to the Groveport Madison program.
Section IV of this note will analyze certain public policy considerations according to
their relevant factors in the Supreme Court’s balancing test.19 In conclusion, this
note will argue that such public policy considerations weigh the Supreme Court’s
balancing test against the program implemented by Groveport Madison, and that
high school drug-testing programs should be limited to those contexts already
specifically upheld by the Court.
II. CASE-LAW BACKGROUND
Some preliminary issues must be addressed before directly discussing the
Supreme Court’s treatment of public high school drug-testing programs. First, this
Section will discuss the applicability of the Bill of Rights and, specifically, the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,20 to public high school students.
Second, this Section will review certain areas of a Fourth Amendment analysis.
These areas include: 1) the types of privacy expectations protected by the Fourth
Amendment; 2) whether a drug test conducted via urinalysis constitutes a search and
seizure that is covered by the Fourth Amendment; and 3) the standards of suspicion
that must be met in particular instances for the government to justify a search.
Finally, this Section will review the Supreme Court’s analysis of suspicionless drugtesting programs, including those implemented by public high schools.
A. Public High School Students Retain Constitutional Rights
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme
Court held that three high school students’ right to freedom of expression was
violated by the school district when it indefinitely suspended the students for
wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.21 In dicta, the
Court stated that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
search and seizure that must satisfy a Fourth Amendment analysis; and 3) the standards of
suspicion that the government must satisfy in order to justify a search.
18
See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding a
suspicionless drug-testing program imposed on certain railway employees); Nat’l Treasury
Employees’ Union v. Von Raab, 589 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding a suspicionless drug-testing
program imposed on certain U.S. Customs service employees); Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646;
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (striking a mandatory drug-testing program on all
candidates for State office); Earls, 536 U.S. 822.
19
These public policy considerations will be categorized according to their relevant
factor(s) in the Court’s balancing test because it is the format in which they should be
considered when formally applying the test to a particular drug-testing program.
20

Hereinafter referred to as the “Fourth Amendment.”

21

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969). The Court
found that the students’ manner of expression did not substantially disrupt or materially
interfere with school activities or the rights of other students, which is the standard applicable
to determining whether school officials may exercise a content-based restriction. The failure
to satisfy this standard mandates a strict scrutiny analysis, which finds content-based
restrictions presumptively unconstitutional. Id.
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speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”22 Further, “state-operated schools
may not be enclaves of totalitarianism,”23 and “students . . . are ‘persons’ under our
Constitution . . . . [t]hey are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must
respect.”24 Additionally, the Court stated that one objective of our nation’s schools is
to educate students for citizenship, which is “reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to . . . teach the youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”25
Subsequently, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court applied a Fourth
Amendment analysis when it upheld a school official’s search of a female student’s
purse.26 Before concluding that this search was reasonable,27 the Court inquired as to
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by public school
officials.28 The Court declared that it is an indisputable proposition that the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution29 “‘prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures by state officers,’”30 and it is “equally indisputable . . . that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students against encroachment by
public school officials.”31 In support of this proposition, the Court stated that schools
act according to “publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies;”32 and,
therefore, “school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as
surrogates for the parents.”33

22

Id. at 506.

23

Id. at 511.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).

26

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1984). After a female high school student was
discovered smoking cigarettes in the girls’ restroom, the assistant vice principal conducted a
search of her purse in pursuit of evidence of this school violation. The search revealed a pack
of cigarettes, a pack of rolling papers, a small amount of marijuana, a smoking pipe, some
empty plastic bags, a large sum of money, and an index card displaying a list of other students
that were indebted to her. The school subsequently turned this evidence over to the police,
and juvenile delinquency charges were brought against her. Id. at 328-29.
27
The Supreme Court’s analysis in concluding that the search was reasonable will be fully
discussed in Section II, Subsection B, Part 4, which specifically addresses the standard used
for reviewing school searches based on reasonable suspicion.
28

Id. at 333-37.

29

The Fourteenth Amendment has provided the means for particular Amendments
contained in the Bill of Rights to directly regulate state action that undermines those rights
seen as “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937). The Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the states by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
30

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960)).

31

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334.

32

Id. at 336.

33

Id.
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B. The Fourth Amendment Scrutiny
The Text of the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Despite the apparent clarity of this language, its application in particular
instances has been quite controversial. For example, it is not always clear what types
of expectations of privacy are protected, or what types of searches must satisfy a
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Additionally, case law has created some exceptions to
the requirement of a warrant based on probable cause, thereby allowing a search to
be supported by either reasonable suspicion or less in certain circumstances.34
Accordingly, this subsection will discuss the types of privacy expectations protected
by the Fourth Amendment, whether a urinalysis constitutes a search and seizure that
must pass constitutional muster, and the relevant standards of suspicion that officials
must have in particular instances before conducting a search.35
1. Privacy expectations that society recognizes as reasonable
The Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment does not protect all
expectations of privacy, but instead only protects reasonable expectations of
privacy.36 In Smith v. Maryland,37 the Court adopted a two-part rule, originally
addressed by Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz,38 which is to be utilized in
determining whether an asserted expectation of privacy is reasonable. First, one
must show an actual, subjective expectation of privacy by attempting to protect
something as private.39 Second, one must show that the subjective expectation of

34

See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), (allowing police officers to conduct a brief
frisk of an individual’s clothing when circumstances give the officer reasonable suspicion that
the individual is carrying a weapon that may be used to harm the officer, regardless of whether
the officer has probable cause to arrest the individual).
35
This discussion is by no means exhaustive of the particular instances in which the Fourth
Amendment applies. This discussion only covers those areas most relevant to the main topic
of the note—suspicionless drug-testing programs in public high schools.
36

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347, 352 (1967) (finding a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a public telephone booth) (“One who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that
the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world”); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s
prison cell) (“We hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any expectation
of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell”).
37

442 U.S. 735 (1979).

38

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring).

39

Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 361) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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privacy is one the public is prepared to accept as reasonable, which is satisfied when,
viewed objectively, the expectation is justifiable under the circumstances.40
In Smith, the Court found that the defendant did not allege a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers dialed from his home telephone.
This information was not the subject of an actual, subjective expectation of privacy
because, as the Court found to be obvious to all telephone subscribers, the telephone
company recorded the information for legitimate business purposes.41 Additionally,
the Court found that society would not accept this expectation of privacy as
reasonable because the information was voluntarily turned over to the telephone
company.42
2. Urinalysis constitutes a search and seizure
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, the Supreme Court upheld
a Federal Railway Administration policy of imposing mandatory blood and urine
tests on employees involved in certain train accidents and based on a supervisor’s
reasonable suspicion, and discretionary breath and urine tests for employees who
violate certain safety rules.43 As a preliminary matter, however, the Court addressed
whether a urinalysis test constitutes a search and seizure that must satisfy a Fourth
Amendment analysis.44 The Court found that “the collection and testing of urine
intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as
reasonable,” which mandates the conclusion that urinalysis testing be subject to
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.45
3. Warrants and probable cause
The Fourth Amendment does not protect the people against all searches, but only
against unreasonable searches.46 Therefore, government officials can conduct a
40

Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 361) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

41

Id. at 742-44.

42

Id.

43

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989). The Court’s
analysis in upholding the FRA policy will be discussed under Section II, subsection C, Part 1,
which specifically addresses the standard used for reviewing suspicionless searches.
44

Id. at 613-17.

45

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court quoted Nat’l Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987) (upholding a U.S. Customs Service policy of
testing all employees that apply for, and are appointed to, certain positions), aff’d, Nat’l
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) where the Fifth Circuit stated
that:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of
urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a
function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance
in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.
46

See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652 (“The Fourth Amendment . . . provides that the Federal
Government shall not violate ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’” (quoting the text of the
Fourth Amendment) (emphasis added)).
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search if it qualifies as reasonable, according to a Fourth Amendment analysis.
However, different circumstances lead to different determinations of what constitutes
a reasonable search.
Ordinarily, searches conducted by law enforcement agents in pursuit of evidence
of criminal activity require a judicial warrant based on probable cause, unless exigent
(emergency) circumstances exist that excuse the warrant requirement.47 The few
exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless search include such situations as
when officers are in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon,48 and when officers have a
reasonable belief that evidence is being destroyed.49 Even in the absence of such
exigent circumstances, police officers are permitted to conduct a warrantless search
of automobiles when they have probable cause to believe the automobile contains
evidence of criminal activity.50 However, the Court has stated that the probable
cause requirement is “‘peculiarly related to criminal investigations’ and may be
unsuited to determining the reasonableness of administrative searches where the
‘Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions.’”51 High
school drug-testing programs fall under this category—school searches are
administrative searches, and the drug-testing programs aim to deter drug abuse
before it becomes an epidemic. Therefore, school officials are not imposed with the
burden of having to obtain either a judicial warrant or probable cause before
conducting a search.
4. Reasonable suspicion in public schools
In T.L.O., the Supreme Court upheld the assistant vice principal’s search of a
female high school student’s purse even though the official did not have probable
cause and a warrant was not secured prior to conducting the search.52 First, the Court
held that “school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who
47
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (“[T]he police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure . . . in most instances
failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent
circumstances”).
48
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (upholding the police officers’ entrance
into a home while in pursuit of a robbery suspect who, only a few minutes before the officers’
entrance, had entered the home himself); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)
(upholding the police officers’ entrance into a suspected drug dealer’s home immediately after
the officers witnessed her retreat into the home only minutes after they arrested an individual
who provided an undercover agent with drugs that the arrestee alleged to have obtained from
the female suspect).
49

See Vasquez v. United States, 454 U.S. 975 (1981) (upholding the police officers’
entrance into an apartment out of fear that individuals inside the apartment would destroy any
and all evidence of drug trafficking after the officers had just arrested several others outside of
the apartment for their involvement in drug activity).
50

See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (upholding the police officers’
warrantless search of a mobile home when the officers had probable cause that contraband was
contained therein).
51

Earls, 536 U.S. at 828 (quoting Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 667-68 (1989)) (emphasis in original).
52

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347-48.
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is under their authority.”53 In support of this, the Court stated that search warrants
are unsuited to the school environment because they “interfere with the maintenance
of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”54
Further, the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on
probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the
law.55 Instead, “the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”56 Such an inquiry
mandates the application of a two-pronged test.57
The first prong demands a determination of whether the search was initially
justified, which is satisfied when the school official has reasonable suspicion the
search will reveal evidence of a violation of either the law or school rules.58 In this
case, the assistant vice principal actually conducted two searches that the Supreme
Court had to consider: the initial search of the student’s purse in pursuit of evidence
that she had been smoking on school grounds, which was a violation of school rules,
and the subsequent search for evidence of drug possession, which was a violation of
the law.59 The assistant vice principal’s initial search for cigarettes was justified
because the student was observed smoking cigarettes in the girls’ restroom, which
provoked a reasonable suspicion that a search of her purse would reveal cigarettes,
possession of which would constitute evidence of violating school rules.60 The Court
found the subsequent search for evidence of drug possession to be justified because
the initial search uncovered rolling papers, which provoked a reasonable suspicion
that a more extensive search of the student’s purse would uncover drugs, possession
of which would constitute a violation of the law.61
The second prong inquires as to whether the search as actually conducted was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified the search,
53

Id. at 340.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 341.

56

Id.

57

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.

58

Id. at 341-42.

59

While looking for evidence of cigarette smoking, the Assistant Vice Principal discovered
rolling papers, which he knew to be popular for rolling marijuana cigarettes. This discovery
prompted the Assistant Vice Principal to search further for evidence of drug use. Id. at 328.
60
Id. at 345-46. “A teacher had reported that T.L.O. was smoking in the lavatory.
Certainly this report gave [the official] reason to suspect that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes
with her; and if she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in which to find
them.”
61
Id. at 347. “The discovery of the rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse. This
suspicion justified further exploration of T.L.O.’s purse, which turned up more evidence of
drug-related activities . . . under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the
search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse.”
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which requires the search to not be excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex
of the student and the nature of the alleged violation.62 Without explanation, the
Court did not specifically address this prong. Instead, the Court only addressed the
inconsistency between its analysis of the first prong and the lower court’s ruling
regarding the reasonableness of the search, without any comment as to why it failed
to apply the second prong.63
C. The Supreme Court’s Analysis of Suspicionless Drug-Testing Programs
1. Suspicionless drug-testing programs in general
The Supreme Court has reviewed the constitutionality of drug-testing programs
imposed by certain governmental agencies without any particularized suspicion of
drug use by the individuals being tested. In Skinner, the Court upheld a Federal
Railway Administration (FRA) policy of imposing mandatory blood and urine tests
on employees involved in certain train accidents and based on a supervisor’s
reasonable suspicion of substance abuse, and discretionary breath and urine tests for
employees who violated certain safety rules. 64 First, the Court stated that a search
does not require a warrant or probable cause when the government can show
“‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, [that] make the
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.’”65 In this case, the FRA
possessed special needs to dispense with the warrant and probable cause
requirements for two reasons. First, FRA employees are involved in a highly safetysensitive profession, which creates an extreme need to prevent drug and alcohol
impairment by the employees.66 Second, requiring either a warrant or probable cause
would place a heavy burden on obtaining this type of evidence because of the
constant rate at which drugs and alcohol are eliminated from the bloodstream.67
The Court conceded that, even when a warrant or probable cause is not required,
“‘some quantum of individualized suspicion’” might be required.68 However, “in
limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are
minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion

62

Id. at 341-42.

63

This author cannot offer any explanation or accurate speculation for the Court’s failure
to specifically address the second prong in its analysis of whether the assistant vice principal’s
search of the student’s purse was constitutional.
64

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609-12.

65

Id. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 351) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (upholding a
probation officer’s search of a probationer’s home based on less than probable cause, because
of the special needs of operating a system of supervision over probationers)).
66

Id. at 619-24.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 624 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)
(upholding the government’s practice of stopping cars at reasonably located checkpoints along
the border and questioning their occupants about immigration status without any
individualized suspicion)).
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would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search
may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.”69
In this case, the Court found that FRA employees had a minimal expectation of
privacy because of their “participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to
ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of
covered employees.”70 Further, the toxicology samples were collected in a medical
environment under conditions similar to a regular physical examination, and the
information was obtained for the limited purpose of detecting substance abuse.71
Each of these factors contributed to the Court’s finding that the program implicated
only upon limited expectations of privacy.72
Regarding the governmental interest furthered by the intrusion, the Court stated,
“[the] Government interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion
is compelling.”73 This is because “a requirement of particularized suspicion of drug
or alcohol use would seriously impede an employer’s ability to obtain this
information [evidence of impairment due to substance abuse], despite its obvious
importance.”74 Because the Court found that the interests served by the drug-testing
program outweighed the employees’ privacy concerns, the Court held that the FRA’s
policy did not require any particularized suspicion in order to impose a drug and
alcohol test on employees who violated certain safety rules or were involved in
certain train accidents.75
The same day the Supreme Court decided Skinner, the Court decided National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.76 This case involved a U.S. Customs
Service policy of imposing a mandatory drug test on employees holding, applying
for, or being appointed to any position that satisfied one of three criteria: those
directly involved in drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws, those required
to carry a firearm, and those required to handle classified material.77
In following the principle utilized in Skinner, the Court in Von Raab stated that,
where the government can show special needs, “beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against
the Government’s interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant
or some level of individualized suspicion.”78 In this case, the Government did
present a special need to justify dispensing with such requirements because of its
substantial interest to “deter drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive
positions within the [U.S. Customs] Service and to prevent the promotion of drug
69

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.

70

Id. at 627.

71

Id. at 626.

72

Id. at 628.

73

Id.

74

489 U.S. at 631.

75

Id. at 633.

76

Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).

77

Id. at 660-61.

78

Id. at 665-66.
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users to those positions.”79 Further, the Service’s “mission would be compromised if
[the Service] were required to seek search warrants in connection with routine, yet
sensitive, employment decisions.”80
After finding that the government possessed special needs that dispense with the
warrant and probable cause requirements, the Court found that “the Government’s
need to conduct the suspicionless searches required by the Customs program
outweigh[ed] the privacy interests of employees engaged directly in drug
interdiction, and of those who otherwise [were] required to carry firearms.”81 The
Court first found that the Government had a compelling interest to prevent “frontline interdiction personnel” from engaging in drug use because the “national interest
in self-protection could be irreparably damaged if those charged with safeguarding it
were, because of their own drug use, unsympathetic to their mission of interdicting
narcotics.”82 Regarding those employees required to carry a firearm, the Court found
that “the public should not bear the risk that employees who may suffer from
impaired perception and judgment will be promoted to positions where they may
need to employ deadly force.”83
Next, the Court balanced these legitimate governmental interests against the
employees’ privacy interests implicated by the search.84 The Court found that U.S.
Customs Service employees directly involved with drug interdiction, as well as those
who carry a firearm, “reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness
and probity . . . because successful performance of their duties depends uniquely on
their judgment and dexterity.”85 Therefore, such employees have a diminished
expectation of privacy. Based on the foregoing, the Court concluded that the
Government’s compelling interests in the safety and integrity of our nation’s borders
outweighed the relevant employees’ diminished expectations of privacy, which
justified imposition of a drug-testing program in the absence of individualized
suspicion.86
In Chandler v. Miller,87 the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a
drug-testing program imposed by the State of Georgia on all candidates seeking

79

Id. at 666.

80

Id. at 667.

81

Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.

82

Id. at 670.

83

Id. at 671.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 672.

86

489 U.S at 679. The Court failed to analyze the drug-testing program as applied to
employees in positions that required handling of classified information because the record was
found to be inadequate for that purpose. Id.
87

Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). This case was decided after the Supreme Court
decided its first case reviewing the constitutionality of a high school drug-testing program,
Vernonia. Some confusion might arise because of the placement of this case out of
chronological order. However, in order to clearly present the principles established for
reviewing the constitutionality of high school drug-testing programs, the two cases that
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nomination or election to state office. The Georgia statute required each candidate to
present a certificate from a state-approved laboratory indicating that the candidate
submitted to and passed a urinalysis drug test within the 30 days prior to qualifying
for nomination or election.88
In beginning its analysis, the Court reinforced the principle that some searches do
not require a warrant or probable cause when the Government can show “special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” that dispense with these
requirements.89 After showing that it has such special needs, the Government is not
obliged to show any individualized suspicion when it can satisfy a context-specific
inquiry that examines the competing private and public interests advanced by the
parties.90
In addressing the preliminary inquiry, the State of Georgia contended it had the
requisite special needs solely because of its sovereign power, reserved to the states
under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to establish qualifications for
state office candidates.91 The Court rejected this contention, however, after finding
that “no precedent [existed] suggesting that a State’s power to establish
qualifications for state offices—any more than its power to prosecute crime—
diminishes the constraints on state action imposed by the Fourth Amendment.”92
Consequently, the Court used the principles established in Skinner,93 Von Raab,94 and
Vernonia School District v. Acton95 in determining whether the State of Georgia
possessed such special needs.96
In analyzing this factor, the Court found the Government’s need to be merely
symbolic, as opposed to special, for two reasons. First, the Government did not
present any evidence of a specific drug problem among the State’s elected officials.97
The Court conceded that a showing of a specific drug problem is not required in all
cases, but such a showing “may help to clarify—and to substantiate—the precise
hazards posed by [drug] use.”98 Second, the Court found that the State’s needs were
specifically address them, Vernonia and Earls have been placed in a subsequent section
independent from the rest of the cases concerning other suspicionless drug-testing programs.
88

Id. at 309.

89

Id. at 313-14.

90

Id.

91

Id. at 317.

92

520 U.S. at 317.

93

489 U.S. 602.

94

489 U.S. 656.

95

515 U.S. 646. As previously stated in note 87, Vernonia will be discussed under Section
II, Subsection C, Part 2, which specifically addresses the Supreme Court’s treatment of public
high school drug-testing programs. This explains why Vernonia is mentioned during the
discussion of Chandler without having first discussed Vernonia in full.
96

See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 317.

97

Id. at 321.

98

Id. at 319. Compare Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646. Chandler found that an “immediate crisis
[was] prompted [in Vernonia] by a sharp rise in students’ use of unlawful drugs, [which]
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not special because the subjected state officials were not performing “high-risk,
safety-sensitive tasks, and the required certification immediately aid[ed] no
interdiction effort.”99 Because the State of Georgia’s drug-testing program was
merely symbolic and the public safety was not “genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment preclude[d] the suspicionless search.”100
2. Suspicionless drug-testing programs in public high schools
In Vernonia, the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory drug-testing program for all
middle school and high school student athletes, which was imposed without any
individualized suspicion of drug use by any particular student(s).101 The Court first
stated that a search conducted by school officials does not require either a warrant or
probable cause when the government can show “special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement,”102 that would render the probable-cause requirement
impracticable. Once this threshold question is answered, schools are permitted to
implement a search based on less than probable cause. However, in order for
schools to be permitted to impose a search without any requirement of individualized
suspicion, courts must balance the competing interests of the school officials and the
students based on three factors. First, courts must review the strength of the privacy
interest upon which the search intrudes.103 Second, the intrusive character of the
search must be determined.104 Third, courts must consider the nature and immediacy
of the government’s concerns that led to the imposition of a suspicionless drugtesting program, along with the effectiveness of the imposed means for addressing
these concerns.105
In this case, the Court found that special needs that make the probable cause
requirement impracticable exist in the public school context.106 This is because the
probable cause requirement would “‘unduly interfere with the maintenance of the
swift and informal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed,’” and because of the
“‘substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools.’”107 After satisfying this threshold inquiry, the Court applied the relevant
factors of the balancing test.
bolstered the government’s and school official’s arguments that drug-testing programs were
warranted and appropriate.”
99
520 U.S. at 321-22. Compare Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (dealing with railway employees
involved with the high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks incumbent upon railroad safety); Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (dealing with U.S. Customs Service employees directly involved with drug
interdiction efforts, and those required to carry firearms).
100

Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.

101

515 U.S. 646, 664-65.

102

Id. at 653. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).

103

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654.

104

Id. at 658.

105

Id. at 660.

106

Id. at 653.

107

Id. at 653 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, 341) (brackets in original).
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In addressing the first factor, the Court found that schoolchildren have a
diminished expectation of privacy because they are placed under the school’s
authority, the nature of which is “custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”108 Even though
students have a diminished expectation of privacy in general, student athletes in
particular have an even lower expectation of privacy because they voluntarily submit
to a degree of control greater than what is imposed on other students.109 Athletes
submit to such a degree of regulation because they are required to undergo preseason
physical examinations, either obtain health insurance coverage or sign an insurance
waiver, maintain a minimum grade point average, and comply with other rules
imposed by the team coaches and the school’s athletic director.110 Further, athletes
engage in communal undress and showering.111
In addressing the second factor, the Court found the invasive nature of the drugtesting program to be negligible.112 The Court first noted, “the degree of intrusion
depends upon the manner in which production of the urine sample is monitored.”113
In this case, the conditions in which the urine samples were furnished were “nearly
identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms.”114 Further, the Court
addressed the invasiveness according to the manner in which the information
obtained from the search was used. This was not excessively invasive because the
information was used solely to detect illicit drug use in order to screen students from
participation in athletics.115 Additionally, the information was furnished only to a
limited class of school officials on a need-to-know basis, and the information was
not passed on to law enforcement personnel for law enforcement purposes.116
Third, the Court addressed the nature and immediacy of the government’s
concerns and the effectiveness of the search at reaching them.117 The nature of the
government’s concerns—combating drug use by schoolchildren—was important
because of the adverse effects that drugs have on the physical and psychological
maturation processes, and because such effects pose an immediate threat of physical
harm to athletes that are under the stress of physical competition.118 Regarding the
immediacy of the government’s concerns, the Court found the need to combat drug

108

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.

109

Id. at 656-67.

110

Id. at 657.

111

Id.

112

Id. at 658.

113

515 U.S. at 658.

114

Id. Male students furnished their samples by urinating into a cup while standing at a
urinal, and female students furnished their samples by urinating into a cup while in individual
stalls. Id.
115

Id.

116

515 U.S. at 658.

117

Id. at 660.

118

Id. at 661-62.
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use in this particular school district was great because the school was in a “state of
rebellion . . . fueled by alcohol and drug abuse,” and the athletes served as the role
models for this rebellious subculture.119 Regarding the program’s efficacy, focusing
the search on the leaders of the rebellious subculture, who were also subjected to the
more immediate threat of physical harm, effectively addressed the school’s
concerns.120
Because the balancing test favored the school’s interests in
implementing a suspicionless drug-testing program over the students’ privacy
interests, the Supreme Court upheld the program as “reasonable and hence
constitutional.”121
Almost seven years later, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of
another suspicionless drug-testing program implemented by a public high school. In
Earls,122 the Court applied the factors established in Vernonia.123 Consequently, the
Court upheld the suspicionless drug-testing program imposed on all high school
students participating in competitive extra-curricular activities, such as band and
choir.124
As a threshold matter, the Court considered whether the school had special needs
that made the probable cause requirement impracticable, which would justify the
imposition of a search based on less than probable cause.125 The Court stated that
schools have special needs to dispense with the probable cause requirement because
of the impracticality of requiring such a stringent standard in the school setting.126
The Court relied primarily on precedent by stating, “this Court has previously held
that ‘special needs’ inhere in the public school context.”127 For further support, the
Court stated that a Fourth Amendment inquiry “cannot disregard the schools’
custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”128 Subsequently, the Court applied
the relevant factors of the balancing test.
The first consideration was the nature of the students’ privacy interests
implicated by the search.129 The Court found that students enjoy a diminished
expectation of privacy in the public school context, “where the State is responsible
for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.”130 In general, schoolchildren have a
lowered expectation of privacy, but those who compete in competitive extracurricular activities voluntarily submit to even greater control than what the rest of
119

515 U.S at 662-63.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 664-65.

122

Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).

123

Id. at 830; see also Veronia, 515 U.S. 646.

124

Earls, 536 U.S. at 838.

125

Id. at 829.

126

Id. at 828-29.

127

Id. at 829 (quoting T.L.O, 469 U.S. at 339-40; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653).

128

Id. at 829-30 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656).

129

Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.

130

Id. (referencing Vernonia, 536 U.S. at 656).
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the student body is subjected to.131 Therefore, the students enjoyed a limited
expectation of privacy.132
The Court next addressed the character of the intrusion of the search.133 The
Court began by stating that the “‘degree of intrusion’ on one’s privacy caused by
collecting a urine sample ‘depends upon the manner in which production of the urine
sample is monitored.’”134 In considering the manner of production of the urine
sample, the character of the intrusion in this case was minimal because the urinalysis
test was not physically invasive and was furnished in the privacy of a restroom.135
Additionally, the Court addressed the minimally invasive manner in which the
information yielded from the search was used. The results obtained from the drug
tests were “kept in confidential files separate from a student’s other educational
records and released to school personnel only on a ‘need to know’ basis.”136 Further,
the information was used solely for detecting illicit drug use, and was “not turned
over to law enforcement [personnel].”137
Third, the Court addressed “the nature and immediacy of the government’s
concerns.”138 In finding the nature of the school’s concerns to be pressing and
important, the Court began by stating that it “has already articulated in detail the
importance of the governmental concern in preventing drug use by
schoolchildren.”139 However, the importance of the government’s concern in
preventing drug use by schoolchildren was found by the Court to be the same, if not
greater, in this case because “the drug abuse problem . . . has hardly abated since
Vernonia was decided in 1995.140 In fact, evidence suggests that it has only grown
worse.”141 Additionally, the “health and safety risks identified in Vernonia142 apply
131
Id. at 831-32. “[S]tudents who participate in competitive extracurricular activities
voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes
. . . All of them have their own rules and requirements for participating students that do not
apply to the student body as a whole.” Id.
132

Id. at 832.

133

Id.

134

Earls, 536 U.S. at 832 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658).

135

Id. at 833. The Court found the test as conducted in this case was “even less
problematic” than the test in Vernonia because, with everything else being equal, the male
students in this case were allowed to furnish their samples in the privacy of individual stalls,
whereas the male students in Vernonia were required to furnish their samples while standing at
urinals.
136

Id.

137

Id. at 833.

138

Id. at 834.

139

Id. (referencing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661-62).

140

Earls was decided in 2002, seven years after Vernonia.

141

Earls, 536 U.S. at 834. “The number of 12th graders using any illicit drug increased
from 48.4 percent in 1995 to 53.9 percent in 2001. The number of 12th graders reporting that
they had used marijuana jumped from 41.7 percent to 49.0 percent during that same period”
(referencing DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MONITORING THE FUTURE: NATIONAL
RESULTS ON ADOLESCENT DRUG USE, OVERVIEW KEY FINDINGS (2001) (Table 1)).
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with equal force to Tecumseh’s143 schoolchildren.”144 Therefore, “the nationwide
drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school.”145
The School District had also presented “specific evidence of drug use at Tecumseh
schools.”146
Regarding the immediacy of the government’s concerns, the Court found the
necessary immediacy in the “need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of
childhood drug use.”147 Further, the evidence of increased drug use in the school
district compounded the immediacy of the government’s concerns in combating drug
use by its students.148
Finally, the Court was satisfied that the school’s drug-testing program was
effective at meeting the school’s concerns.149 The Court conceded that, in Vernonia,
there “might have been a closer fit between the testing of athletes and the trial court’s
finding that the drug problem was ‘fueled by the “role model” effect of athletes’ drug
use.’”150 However, the Court stated that this finding was not essential to the holding
in Vernonia, and that schools are not required to test the group[s] of students most
likely to use drugs.151
Instead, the Vernonia test considers a program’s
constitutionality according to the school’s custodial responsibilities over its
students.152 In reviewing the drug-testing program in this case according to the
School District’s custodial responsibilities, the Court found that “the drug testing of
Tecumseh students who participate in extracurricular activities effectively serves the

142

515 U.S. at 661-62. These risks concern the inhibiting effects on an adolescent’s
healthy psycho-social development and maturation processes.
143
The Tecumseh School District is the one that implemented the drug-testing program
under scrutiny in Earls.
144

Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.

145

Id.

146
Id. “Teachers testified that they had seen students who appeared to be under the
influence of drugs and that they had heard students speaking openly about using drugs. A
drug dog found marijuana cigarettes near the school parking lot. Police officers once found
drugs or drug paraphernalia in a car driven by a Future Farmers of America member. And the
school board president reported that people in the community were calling the board to discuss
the ‘drug situation.’” Id. at 834-35.
147

Id. at 836.

148

Id. Respondents argued that there was not an immediate drug epidemic facing the
school district, as was found in Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662-63. However, in Earls, the Court
stated that “it would make little sense to require a school district to wait for a substantial
portion of its students to begin using drugs before it was allowed to institute a drug testing
program,” and that the Court “refuse[d] to fashion what would in effect be a constitutional
quantum of drug use necessary to show a ‘drug problem.’”
149

Earls, 536 U.S. at 837.

150

Id. at 837-38 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663).

151

Id. at 838.

152

Id.
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School District’s interest in protecting the safety and health of its students.”153
Ultimately, the Court found that the school’s interests in implementing the
suspicionless drug-testing program outweighed the students’ privacy expectations,
and held that the school’s “policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School
District’s important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its
schoolchildren.”154
Even though the Supreme Court established this balancing test to determine the
constitutionality of high school drug-testing programs, some ambiguities remain.
The Court has applied the test only to programs involving competitive extracurricular activities, athletic and otherwise; therefore, it is unclear whether drugtesting programs imposed in other contexts will be upheld. In response to this
ambiguity, the next section will apply the factors of the Court’s balancing test to the
program imposed by Groveport Madison High School.
III. VERNONIA FACTORS APPLIED
The Groveport Madison drug-testing program is subject to scrutiny under the test
established by the Supreme Court in Vernonia. This section will apply the requisite
factors of the test to the Groveport Madison drug-testing program.155 As will be
seen, after a strict application of the balancing test, the Groveport Madison program
is likely to be found constitutional. It will be argued later, however, that public
policy considerations weigh the balance against expanding drug-testing programs to
contexts beyond those already addressed by the Supreme Court, including programs
imposed on students applying for on-campus parking privileges.
A. Special Needs
Before application of the balancing test, the threshold inquiry of whether the
circumstances require either a search warrant or probable cause, or whether special
needs exist that would render the warrant and probable cause requirements
impracticable, must be satisfied.156 The Supreme Court has held that such special
needs do exist in the public school context because the requirement that a search be
based on probable cause would unduly interfere with the need to maintain order and
to exact swift discipline.157 Because Groveport Madison is a public school in Ohio,
courts are highly likely to find that the school has special needs that would justify
imposition of a search based on less than probable cause. Subsequent to satisfaction
of this inquiry, the balancing test must weigh in favor of the school in order for its
suspicionless drug-testing program to be upheld.

153

Id. at 837. The Court failed to offer any substantive analytical or evidentiary support
for this finding without any explanation or reasoning for this failure.
154

Id. at 838.

155

The application of the factors in this section may not be exactly the same as applied by
a court in formal litigation proceedings because of this author’s lack of access to exhaustive
facts. Therefore, this application is primarily speculative and is based on the Court’s dicta and
holdings in Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646 and Earls, 536 U.S. 822.
156

See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; Earls, 536 U.S. at 828.

157

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654; Earls, 536 U.S. at 828-30.
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B. The Privacy Interests Implicated by the Search
After the threshold inquiry has been satisfied, the first factor in the balancing test
considers the nature of the privacy interests implicated by the search.158 The
Supreme Court has previously stated that students possess a lower expectation of
privacy than the rest of society, at least while under a school’s authority.159 This is
due to the “custodial and tutelary” functions that schools exercise over their
students.160 Further, the Court has recognized circumstances where, through
participation in certain organizations, some students voluntarily diminish their
expectations of privacy even further.161
In the Groveport Madison case, the subjects of the drug-testing programs are
public high school students. Because of the custodial and tutelary functions that the
school exercises over the students, their expectations of privacy are highly likely to
be perceived as diminished. Further, the drug-testing program in question is
imposed as a condition on obtaining an on-campus parking permit. The Supreme
Court has previously held that owners/operators of automobiles enjoy a lesser degree
of privacy expectations than the rest of society.162 Therefore, the students subject to
the Groveport Madison drug-testing program have likely volunteered to decrease
their already diminished expectations of privacy simply by applying for an oncampus parking permit.
C. The Invasiveness of the Drug-Testing Program
The second factor in the balancing test commands a consideration of how
invasive the drug-testing program is into the privacy of the subjects.163 The
Groveport Madison drug-testing program is conducted via urinalysis. In both
Vernonia and Earls, the drug-testing programs in question were also conducted via
urinalysis. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court found that the programs were
158

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654; Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.

159

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655; Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-32.

160

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655; Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-32.

161
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656-57 (student athletes voluntarily submit to physical
examinations, are required either to obtain health insurance coverage or to sign an insurance
waiver, maintain a minimum grade point average, abide by other team and school rules, and
also engage in communal undress and showering); Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-32 (students
participating in competitive extra-curricular activities voluntarily submit to rules and
regulations that are particularized to their group(s) and not imposed on the student body as a
whole).
162

See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (“[O]ne’s expectation
of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the
traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”) (upholding the
government’s practice of stopping and questioning motorists at reasonably located checkpoints
on the borders absent any individualized suspicion); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
(holding that privacy interests in automobiles are diminished for two reasons: first, vehicles
are readily movable, which makes a warrant impracticable because the vehicle could flee the
location before a warrant is obtained; second, there are strict governmental regulations on
vehicle ownership and use).
163

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832.
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not invasive because of the conditions in which the urine samples were furnished,
and because of the limited purpose for which the information was used.164
This factor may be more questionable in the Groveport Madison case than in the
others, but it is still likely to be satisfied. For example, the urine samples are likely
furnished under conditions similar to those in the cases that have already met the
Supreme Court’s approval because, presumably, they are provided in school
restrooms.165 Arguably, however, the company used by Groveport Madison to
conduct the urinalysis tests may have undermined the minimally intrusive character
of the program. The company allegedly allowed a male employee to monitor the
girls’ samples by positioning him so that he could see into the girls’ restroom and
observe the stalls.166 On the other hand, the courts will likely dismiss this as one
instance of an error in judgment, which likely will not jeopardize the program in its
entirety.167
The Groveport Madison program is also likely to be viewed as minimally
intrusive because the information obtained by the tests is used for limited purposes.
One purpose for which the information is used is to prevent students from driving
while under the influence of illicit drugs and/or alcohol.168 Another purpose is to
help wayward youth by diverting students that test positive into counseling.169
However, arguably, these purposes may be pre-textual. The Groveport Madison
Principal has been quoted as saying, “we have some kids who have problems.
Parents want to know if their kids are using or not.”170 Informing parents of their
children’s drug activity may not be a legitimate purpose for imposing a drug-testing
program because it appears merely to be an attempt at side-stepping the constraints

164

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832-33. In both cases, the urine samples
were furnished in restrooms, and the information was used solely to detect alcohol and/or
illicit drug use to determine candidacy for the respective activities; further, the information
was not turned over to law enforcement authorities.
165
This author states that the samples are “presumably” furnished in school restrooms,
similar to the situations in Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646 and Earls, 536 U.S. 822, because one
newspaper article hints that the urine samples were furnished in restrooms exclusive to each
gender. Bush, supra note 7 (“the testing firm had a man in the women’s restroom while girls
were urinating into cups in the stalls”).
166

Id; Harden, Parking Policy, supra note 7. The Groveport Madison Principal countered
this allegation by showing Columbus Dispatch journalist Mike Harden where the monitors’
table was situated, which was reportedly in a position where the monitor could possibly
observe some of the stalls.
167

See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833 (when addressing the allegation that the Choir teacher had
inadvertently left a list of one student’s current prescription drugs in a position where other
students were able to discover the information, the Supreme Court stated, “this one example of
alleged carelessness hardly increases the character of the intrusion”).
168

Bush, supra note 7 (referring to school officials as saying, “the measure is to discourage
students from driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol”).
169
Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7 (quoting principal Mike Beck as saying, “I want
to help kids, and we have some kids who have problems . . . [t]he idea is not disciplining them,
but educating them. If they’re impaired, we’re trying to get them into a treatment program”).
170

Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7.
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imposed on state officials’ policing powers. Despite this, the program will likely be
viewed as minimally intrusive into the students’ expectations of privacy because it is
conducted under conditions that the Supreme Court has already viewed as similar to
those in which the bodily function is ordinarily performed.
D. The Nature and Immediacy of the School’s Concerns
The next factor in the Supreme Court’s balancing test considers the nature and
immediacy of the school’s concerns that initially led to the imposition of a drugtesting program.171 In each of the previous cases, the Supreme Court found that the
nature of the government’s concerns was important, and that the immediacy of the
concerns was great.172 The Groveport Madison program is likely to receive similar
treatment.
The nature of the Groveport Madison School District’s concerns will most likely
be seen as important because the adverse health and safety risks that drugs have on
schoolchildren, both physically and psychologically, remain just as dangerous as
they were in the previous cases. Additionally, the Court in Vernonia highlighted the
fact that the nature of the school district’s concerns were increased because the focal
points, student athletes, were threatened with an even greater risk of immediate
physical harm due to the high stress of physical competition.173 In Groveport
Madison, the focal point is on student drivers, who are likely to be seen as facing a
greater risk of immediate physical harm from drug use because students who drive
under the influence are inflicted with impaired driving abilities, which increases the
risk of automobile accidents. Finally, in Earls, the Court placed some emphasis on
the fact that the “nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing
concern in every school.” 174 Because the war against drugs has not abated much, if
at all, since the Court made this statement, the government's concern is likely to be
seen as just as pressing in the Groveport Madison case.
Based on precedent, it is unclear whether the immediacy of the concerns of the
Groveport Madison School District will also be seen as great. When addressing this
prong of the balancing test, the Court in Vernonia only discussed the fact that the
school district was in a “‘state of rebellion . . . fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as
well as by the student’s [sic] misperceptions about the drug culture.’”175 Although
the Court did not discuss any other evidentiary facts in addressing the immediacy of
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660; Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661-63 (the nature of the concerns was important because of the
adverse effects that drugs have on the development processes, compounded with the threat of
physical harm to athletes; the immediacy was great because the school district was
experiencing an increase in drug use, which was fueled by student athletes); Earls, 536 U.S. at
834-36 (the nature of the concerns was important because of the nationwide epidemic of drug
use, and because of the health and safety risks that face schoolchildren who abuse drugs; the
need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of childhood drug use, as well as the increased
drug use in the particular school district, provided the necessary immediacy).
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662.
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Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 1354,
1357 (D. Or. 1992)).
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the school’s concerns, the Court in Earls stated that this “finding was not essential to
the holding,” and also stated that the Court “did not require the school to test the
group of students most likely to use drugs, but rather considered the constitutionality
of the program in the context of the public school’s custodial responsibilities.”176
Although the Court in Earls interpreted this factor to only require a consideration of
the school’s custodial responsibilities over its students, the opinion in Vernonia does
not state this proposition at all. Therefore, it is unclear whether the opinions are
inconsistent and unclear as to which interpretation future cases should rely upon. If
the Vernonia interpretation177 is applied, then it is unclear whether this factor is
satisfied because this author has no facts indicating that the Groveport Madison
School District is experiencing an increase in drug use or is under threat of a drug
epidemic. Alternatively, if the Earls interpretation178 is applied, then the school’s
concerns will likely be seen as immediate because of the custodial responsibilities
that the school exercises over its students.
E. The Efficacy of the Drug-Testing Program
The final factor in the balancing test is to consider the effectiveness of the
imposed drug-testing program at achieving the government’s concerns.179 In
Vernonia, the Court found the program to be effective at meeting the school’s
concerns because it was narrowly focused on student athletes, who were the leaders
of the rebellious subculture and who were also subjected to a more immediate threat
of physical harm.180 In Earls, the Court found that the drug-testing program
effectively addressed the school’s concerns “in protecting the safety and health of its
students.”181
Based on precedent, the Groveport Madison program is likely to be viewed as
effective at addressing the school’s concerns. Although the Vernonia analysis
appeared to have relied on the fact that the program was narrowly focused on student
athletes, the Earls analysis182 stated that this factor, like the former, is to be
considered according to the school’s custodial responsibilities over its students. If
the Earls analysis is relied upon, the effectiveness of the Groveport Madison case
will likely be found simply because the school is exercising its custodial
responsibilities over the students. The Groveport Madison school officials imposed
this drug-testing program in order to prevent students from driving while under the
influence of illicit drugs and also to divert wayward youth into counseling.183 This
176

Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-38.
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This interpretation appears to rely upon a showing that the particular school district
involved is under a threat of student rebellion fueled by alcohol and/or drug use.
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Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-38. This interpretation requires only that the constitutionality of
the program be determined by considering the context of the school’s custodial responsibilities
over its students.
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660; Earls, 536 U.S. at 837.
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663.
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Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-38.
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Id. at 838.

183

Bush, supra note 7; Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7.
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will likely lead to the conclusion that the school is “protecting the safety and health
of its students,”184 which would lead to the conclusion that the program is effective at
achieving the school’s concerns.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
This section discusses several public policy considerations that ought to be
addressed when applying the pertinent factors in the Supreme Court’s balancing test.
Arguably, these public policy considerations weigh the balance in favor of limiting
public school drug-testing programs to the contexts already considered by the Court,
and inhibit expanding such programs to other contexts, such as the program imposed
by Groveport Madison.
A. Special Needs
The threshold inquiry that must be satisfied before applying the balancing test is
whether schools can show special needs to impose a search without securing a
judicial warrant or possessing probable cause.185 The Supreme Court has found that
schools satisfy this inquiry because of their custodial and tutelary responsibility over
the students, and because strict adherence to these requirements would unduly
interfere with the substantial need for schools to maintain order.186 However, one
public policy concern counteracts these justifications.
Despite the substantial need for schools to maintain order while exercising their
custodial and tutelary responsibilities over students, the Supreme Court has held that
schools, acting as state agents, must respect students’ constitutional rights.187 For
example, in Tinker, the Court stated that “state-operated schools may not be enclaves
of totalitarianism,” and that “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over
their students.”188 Further, when the Court found that schoolchildren retain a
legitimate expectation of privacy, it declared that it was not ready to hold that “the
schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”189
Because schools ought to respect students’ legitimate expectations of privacy,
they should not be able to dispense with the constraints ordinarily imposed on state
agents—such as requiring a warrant, probable cause, or some kind of particularized
suspicion—simply because they have decided to impose a drug-testing program on
its students. Instead, the school whose drug-testing program is in question should be
obligated to show that it had been experiencing some kind of epidemic with drug
abuse or student rebellion before it implemented the program. This would provide
the school with the requisite special needs to dispense with the warrant and probable
184

Earls, 536 U.S. at 838.
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T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652; Earls, 536 U.S. at 828.
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
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See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41.
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393 U.S. at 511.
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T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338-39. The Court was referring to Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977), wherein it held that the need to maintain order in prisons leads to inmates
enjoying no legitimate expectation of privacy. The Court stated that this need for order is not
parallel in the school systems to the extent that students should not be given a legitimate
expectation of privacy.
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cause requirements because its custodial responsibilities and maintenance of order
would be threatened, and the school would be forced to impose the drug-testing
program as a means of rebuilding order and integrity in its school district.
B. The Nature of the Privacy Interests Implicated
After satisfaction of the threshold inquiry, the first factor in the Supreme Court’s
balancing test is the nature of the individual privacy interests implicated by the drugtesting program.190 In addressing this factor, the Court has stated that students in
general have a diminished expectation of privacy because of the custodial and
tutelary functions that schools have over students.191 Additionally, students involved
in competitive extra-curricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to an even
greater degree of control than other students, which erodes their privacy interests
even further.192 However, two public policy considerations support the students’
privacy interests.
The first public policy consideration concerns one of the primary objectives of
our nation’s schools. Schoolchildren are at such a tender age that they may be
ignorant as to what constitutional rights are afforded to our nation’s citizens.
Additionally, they may be ignorant as to the functioning of our government, and
especially ignorant as to the interaction of the government with its citizenry.
Because of this, the Supreme Court has found that one of the most important
functions of schools is to prepare students for citizenship, and, therefore, should not
teach students to “discount important principles of our government [including
constitutional rights] as mere platitudes.”193 This suggests that students have to be
taught to recognize and respect our government’s important principles, including
constitutional rights. One such important principle of our government is that the
citizenry retains a right to privacy, which includes the right to be protected from
unreasonable governmental interference.194
However, when schools impose
suspicionless drug-testing programs based on general concerns about drug use—
instead of in response to an actual epidemic or problem with drug use in its particular
school district—students learn that their constitutional rights are flexible under the
weight of governmental pressure, and their privacy should be stripped away
whenever the government expresses some abstract, generalized concern.195 Further,
the students are learning that, in the eyes of authority, they are guilty until proven
innocent, even in the absence of any particularized suspicion.196
190

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654; Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
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See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-57; Earls 536 U.S. at 830-32.
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See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-57; Earls 536 U.S. at 830-32.

193

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
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See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (“Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied
in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can
no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise . . . . Our decision, founded on reason
and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him . .
.”).
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See GUNJA et al., supra note 2, at 17.
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Instead, students should be taught that their rights are inalienable, and that, as
citizens, their privacy interests should not be swept aside at the government’s
pleasure. In order for students to understand and respect their right to privacy as
against the government, they must have their right respected by the authority figures
that are in a position to strip the right away. If school officials deprive students of
their right to privacy by imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program based on
abstract, generalized concerns, the students will not be taught how important this
right is, and will most likely discount it as a “mere platitude.”197
Of equal importance, students should learn to understand and respect the
important governmental principle that one who is accused of wrongdoing is afforded
a presumption of innocence.198 The accusing party must rebut this presumption of
innocence before the accused can be deemed responsible for any wrongdoing, rather
than the accused having to bear the burden of establishing his/her innocence.199 If
students are not granted this presumption of innocence, then its importance will be
lost, and the students will most likely discount it as a “mere platitude.”200
The second public policy consideration under this factor is that students’ privacy
interests should be respected so that the relationships between the students and their
mentors are not tarnished. When teachers and coaches serve as mentors, students
begin to trust and confide in them. These relationships are vital to the students’
learning environment and maturation processes. These relationships provide the
students with role models that may help them follow a healthy path of maturation
and psycho-social development, as well as fostering a more positive and productive
learning environment.201 However, when these officials are compelling students to
choose between either exposing their privacy or forfeiting a particular benefit or
privilege, the relationship is damaged.202 Consequently, the students might harbor
negative attitudes toward school in general, and to the school official in particular,
thereby jeopardizing the student’s educational and developmental processes.
Accordingly, Drs. Gunja, Cox, Rosenbaum, and Appel argue, “drug testing can
undermine student-teacher relationships by pitting students against the teachers and
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T.L.O., 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
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See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (“The presumption of innocence, a
thought not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our
system of criminal justice.”).
199
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (A presumption of innocence is “[t]he
fundamental principle that a person may not be convicted of a crime unless the government
proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without any burden placed on the accused to prove
innocence.”).
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Id.
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See GUNJA et al., supra note 2, at 8. This publication notes that “student-teacher trust
helps create an atmosphere in which students can address their fears and concerns, both about
drug use itself and the issues in their lives that can lead to drug use, including depression,
anxiety, peer pressure, and unstable family lives.”
202

Id. “Trust is jeopardized if teachers act as confidants in some circumstances but as
police in others.”
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coaches who test them, [thereby] eroding trust, and leaving students feeling ashamed
and resentful.” 203
C. Invasiveness
The second factor in the Supreme Court’s balancing test is to consider how
invasive the search is.204 In Vernonia and Earls, the Court found the drug-testing
programs were not excessively invasive because of the manner in which production
of the urine samples were monitored, and because of the limited purpose for which
the information obtained from the drug tests was used.205 In considering the manner
in which production of the urine samples were monitored, the Court stated that the
nature of the urinalysis process was not very different from the normal process of
urination.206 In both cases, the urine samples were furnished in the privacy of
restrooms, with the girls in stalls, and the boys in either a stall or standing at a
urinal.207
However, the Court did not address the fact that the students furnishing urine
samples were being observed by adult monitors, whose job was to ensure that the
urine samples were not tampered with in any way, which is abnormal to the urination
process and may produce anxiety and embarrassment on behalf of the students.208
Adding insult to injury, the Groveport Madison case involved a male monitor
overseeing the girls’ samples by positioning himself so that he could see into the
girls’ restroom.209 Needless to say, this is not normal to the ordinary function and
also produced some discomfort and embarrassment on behalf of the girls providing
the urine samples.210 Further, the students urinate into plastic cups and the monitor
then tests the urine for any abnormal characteristics, which also is not a part of the
ordinary urinary function and may produce anxiety or embarrassment on behalf of
the students. Because these conditions are not part of the normal urination process,
and may be the source of anxiety or embarrassment for students, courts should be
more hesitant to find that a urinalysis sample is furnished in conditions similar to
those in which the function is ordinarily performed. Consequently, courts should
203

Id.
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832.
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832-33
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832-33.
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832-33. In Vernonia, males provided
their samples while standing at urinals, whereas females provided their samples while in
individual stalls. In Earls, however, males were allowed to provide their samples while in
individual stalls as well, which the Court found to provide greater protection of privacy
interests.
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See Brief of Respondents at 3, Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (No. 01-332) (“One of the faculty
monitors joked that the process seemed like an exercise in ‘potty training,’ which produced
embarrassment on behalf of Respondent.”).
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Bush, supra note 7; Harden, Parking Policy, supra note 7.
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Columbus Dispatch reporter Bill Bush quoted student Shannon Partlow as saying,
“there was a man sitting in our bathroom while we were trying to take our drug test, trying to
do our business . . . that made me extremely uncomfortable.” Bush, supra note 7.
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recognize that such abnormal conditions heighten the invasiveness of drug-testing
programs.
Another condition of drug-testing programs that should be considered when
analyzing their invasiveness, which also tends to weigh in favor of the students’
privacy interests, is how consent to the programs is obtained. Schools obtain consent
to drug-testing programs by requiring students to submit to, and pass, a drug-test in
order to participate in some extracurricular activity, or to receive some other
privilege not conferred on all students. However, this consent may not be
meaningful enough to be valid, which would increase the invasiveness of the drugtesting programs on students’ privacy interests, possibly to the point where they are
not justified in the balancing test.
Participation in extracurricular activities is vital to students’ schooling. They
assist students in gaining acceptance into an institution of higher education and in
obtaining jobs after graduation; they provide memorable experiences of the school
years; they foster healthy peer relationships; and they teach important life, social,
and vocational skills, such as teamwork, responsibility, dedication, and perseverance.
For these reasons, students might seriously consider allowing their privacy to be
violated just so they do not lose the privilege of participating in such important
activities. If a student succumbs to the required drug-testing program primarily for
this reason, then one may argue that the consent is not meaningful and, therefore, is
not valid.
This argument can be extended to on-campus parking privileges as well. For
some students, their ability to drive to school may be their only means of
transportation. However, some of these students may not be able to drive to school
at all if they are not able to park on campus, because of a possible inability to park in
the area surrounding campus. Consequently, students who must rely on their own,
independent mode of transportation, such as students who live in rural areas, may not
be able to secure a ride to and from school on a daily basis, or at least a ride that will
get them to school on time regularly. Further, the student’s parent(s) may not be able
to provide transportation because of obligations with work and/or younger siblings.
Therefore, a student who depends on being able to provide for his/her own
transportation to and from school would be forced to consent to a drug test just so
s/he does not have to face the undue hardship of having to find alternative
transportation, if any is to be found at all. Therefore, consent to the drug-testing
program would not be meaningful and would therefore be invalid. Consequently, the
invasiveness of the drug-testing program for students applying for on-campus
parking permits would be too great to justify.
Additionally, some students who participate in extracurricular activities may also
depend on being able to provide their own transportation during weekend and after
school hours because of an inability to secure alternative transportation from other
students or parents. If these students are forced to give up their on-campus parking
privileges, and, consequently, their ability to drive to and from school, then they
would also be forced to forfeit participation in extracurricular activities. By
forfeiting participation in extracurricular activities, the students would be denied the
benefits and skills normally obtained through such involvement, as previously
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discussed.211 Therefore, the students would likely forfeit their privacy interests in
order to maintain participation in such important extracurricular activities.
Therefore, consent to the program will not be meaningful and will thus be invalid.
High school students are at such a tender age that they are likely to take for
granted their constitutional rights and the functioning of government, and, if forced
to choose, are likely to favor participation in certain activities or receiving certain
privileges over the preservation of constitutional rights. As previously discussed,
students may be ignorant as to what rights are afforded to them in particular, and
what rights are afforded to our nation’s citizens in general. For this reason, the
Supreme Court has stated that one primary objective of our nation’s schools is to
prepare students for citizenship, and that schools should not teach students to
“discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”212 As
previously discussed, this suggests that students have to be taught to respect
governmental principles, including constitutional rights. Because students have to be
taught to respect their constitutional rights, they are not likely to favor them over
participation in extracurricular activities or receipt of parking privileges.
Participation in extracurricular activities and receiving parking privileges cause
immediate, empirical effects when they are either granted or denied, whereas
dismissing a constitutional right is likely to have only abstract effects that are not
easily recognized by individual students. Consequently, when faced with having to
choose between forfeiting an abstract constitutional right that the student may not
even be fully educated about, or a privilege or benefit that is highly desired or
important to the student, the student is likely to choose to dismiss the abstract
constitutional right. However, this may not qualify as an informed decision, and
may not be meaningful consent to the drug-testing program. Therefore, when
considering the lack of meaningful consent, drug-testing programs may actually be
much more invasive of students’ privacy interests than the Supreme Court had
originally considered.
D. The Efficacy of Drug-Testing Programs
The final factor213 considered in the Supreme Court’s balancing test is the
efficacy (the effectiveness) of the imposed drug-testing program at achieving the
government’s concerns.214 The Court has found that this factor weighs in favor of a
drug-testing program when there is a factual showing of an increase in drug use by
students in the particular school district under scrutiny, and/or by the particular group
of students being tested.215 However, in Earls, the Court emphasized that schools
211

Such benefits and skills include gaining acceptance into an institution of higher
education, obtaining a job, creating memorable experiences, fostering healthy peer
relationships, and instilling various important life, social, and vocational skills.
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Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
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This author has not discussed the previous two factors of the Court’s balancing test—
the nature and immediacy of the government’s concerns—because of an inability to find any
public policy considerations that counteract their force in the test.
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Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663-64 (the school district was found to be in a state of rebellion
led by student athletes, which made drug-testing the district’s athletes particularly effective at
reaching the government’s concerns).
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are not required to test the particular group(s) of students most likely to use drugs,
but, instead, “[the] constitutionality of the program [should be considered] in the
context of the public school’s custodial responsibilities.”216 Therefore, it is not
completely clear whether this factor requires a finding that the school district, or the
particular group being tested, is experiencing an increase in drug use. However,
numerous public policy considerations beg that not every drug-testing program be
considered effective at meeting the government’s concerns, regardless of whether the
program targets an at-risk group.
One public policy consideration in this area concerns the funds used to
implement and sustain the programs. This consideration argues that schools are
wasting much-needed resources in implementing and sustaining drug-testing
programs, because empirical studies have shown that they are not effective at
deterring drug use. In conducting one of the first empirical studies that analyzed the
effectiveness of drug-testing programs at combating student drug use, Drs. Johnston,
O’Malley, and Yamaguchi found no significant differences in marijuana or other
illicit drug use by students in schools that implemented any kind of drug-testing
program.217 Another study surveyed student athletes’ attitudes and behavior
regarding drug use and found that health concerns were the most common reason for
abstention.218 Most notably, this study found that detection of illicit drug use was not
a concern of the students.219 Because of the overall ineffectiveness of drug-testing
programs at deterring drug use, schools that implement such programs are wasting
necessary resources that could be diverted to more beneficial uses.220
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DRUG TESTING IN SCHOOLS: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND ASSOCIATION WITH STUDENT DRUG USE
(2003), at 15. This study used cross-sectional data for a 12-month period to analyze the effect
that drug-testing programs had on marijuana and other illicit drug use by middle school and
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Another public policy consideration is that drug-testing programs deter students
from engaging in extracurricular activities or seeking other privileges contingent
upon passing a drug test out of fear of being tested.221 To corroborate this
proposition, Drs. Gunja, Cox, Rosenbaum, and Appel pointed out that one school
district under legal scrutiny for its drug-testing program “has seen a dramatic
reduction in student participation in extracurricular activities since implementing
drug testing.”222 One female student from the Tulia Independent School District223
who was interviewed regarding the drug-testing program stated that she “know[s]
lots of kids who don’t want to get into sports and stuff because they don’t want to get
drug tested; [t]hat’s one of the reasons [she was] not into any [activity].”224 The
deterrence of students from engaging in extracurricular activities is dangerous
because studies have shown the benefits and positive correlations of participation in
such activities. For example, one study shows that students who participate in
extracurricular activities are less likely to develop substance abuse problems; are less
likely to engage in violent crime and other dangerous behavior; and are more likely
to stay in school, achieve higher grades, and aim for, and receive, more ambitious
educational goals.225 Therefore, students denied from participation in extracurricular
activities due to their choice of respecting their privacy may experience some very
harsh consequences that may negatively affect their future. Consequently, drugtesting programs may actually have a negative effect for students who choose to
respect their right to privacy.
Whatever merit these arguments have in weighing against drug-testing programs
imposed as a condition on extracurricular activities, they may not have a similar
effect when applied to the Groveport Madison program because it involves oncampus parking privileges, which may not have any direct effect on the educational
and maturation processes. However, as previously discussed, some students denied
from receiving on-campus parking privileges may not be able to participate in such
extracurricular activities at all. Some students denied on-campus parking privileges
may not be able to drive to school if there are no alternative areas in which the
students may park. These students may not be able to rely on any alternative mode
of transportation either, because they may live in areas that are too far to walk to a
bus stop or are too far out of the way for a friend to provide a ride. Further, the
221
See GUNJA et al., supra note 2, at 12-13; J. Wald, Extracurricular Drug Testing, 21
EDUCATION WEEK 34, 36 (2002).
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GUNJA et al., supra note 2, at 13 (referring to Affidavit of Plaintiff Nancy Cozette Bean,
p. 3, Bean v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 2-01CV-0394J (D. Tex. Filed February 18, 2003)
(“In 1990-1991 participation of black seniors was 100% in extracurricular clubs and activities
and 100% in sports; while the 2000-2001 participation rates of black seniors fell to 0% within
both [after implementation of a drug-testing program]”)).
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students’ parent(s) may not be able to provide a ride to and from school because of
obligations with work and/or younger siblings. If these students are not able to
obtain transportation to and from school on a regular basis, then, additionally, the
students will likely be precluded from obtaining regular transportation to and from
activity sites after school hours. Therefore, some students denied on-campus parking
privileges may be deterred from participating in the extracurricular activities that
have a positive impact on the students’ educational and maturation processes.
Another public policy consideration in this area is that students may abstain from
using drugs that are known to be tested, or drugs that are easily detected, and simply
switch to using harder drugs that are either more difficult to test or are not tested at
all by the imposed program.226 For example, urinalysis tests are not very effective at
detecting alcohol, amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, opiates, methamphetamines
(a derivative of amphetamines), and methaqualone (Quaaludes) because they pass
through the body within a few days.227 Urinalysis tests are also not very effective at
detecting lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) because of its extreme sensitivity to heat
above room temperature and direct exposure to light.228 Alternatively, marijuana and
phencyclidine (PCP) both have a much more prolonged stay in the body, ranging
from one day to several weeks.229 Consequently, marijuana and PCP are the drugs
most easily detected by drug-testing programs, unless the subject(s) have used one of
the other substances, excluding LSD, within the previous one to three days before
providing a urine sample. Therefore, students may simply refrain from abusing
marijuana and PCP so as to avoid detection, and instead abuse the harder drugs that
are not as easily detected.
E. Slippery Slope
One final public policy consideration deals with the future of drug-testing
programs as a whole, and is not restricted to any one factor in the Supreme Court’s
balancing test. Although this particular consideration does not apply to any of the
factors in the test, it is an important concern that must be considered when discussing
the impact of any constitutional issue. The Supreme Court has already upheld two
types of high school drug-testing programs, and the possibility is left open to uphold
programs in other contexts as well. If drug-testing programs continue to be upheld,
eventually every student group is in danger of being subjected to a suspicionless
drug-testing program. Conceivably, schools may reach the point where they require
every student in school to submit to a drug test, regardless of student group
affiliation.
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Since the early-to-mid-1990s, around the time that the Gun Free School Zones
Act230 was signed into law, schools have begun to implement strict zero tolerance
policies.231 Although zero tolerance policies were initially implemented to combat
possession of weapons in schools, with the intended consequence of making schools
safer, such policies have expanded to include other behavior viewed as disruptive or
dangerous, such as drug and alcohol use.232 Such zero tolerance policies have led to
students being subjected to interference by school officials for conduct that many
would consider trivial.233 Some schools have even begun to require every student
entering the school to pass through a metal detector in order to screen out those
attempting to bring weapons into the school.234 If the trend of schools imposing
suspicionless drug-testing programs on students is not halted at some point, then
schools may see them as a routine attempt at maintaining order and discipline.
Consequently, schools may begin to impose them on any and all groups of students,
including non-competitive extracurricular activities such as multi-cultural club or
peer mentor programs, with the eventual step of imposing suspicionless drug tests on
every student in attendance at the school, much like subjecting every student entering
the school to a metal detector search.
V. CONCLUSION
Public schools have begun to implement drug-testing programs that students are
required to pass before they are allowed to participate in certain extracurricular
activities or receive some other privileges. The schools receive consent to the drugtesting programs because participation in the activities and receipt of the privileges is
voluntary and is contingent upon passing the test. One controversial example of
such a drug-testing program has been implemented by Groveport Madison High
School in Groveport, Ohio. This program requires students to pass a drug test in
order to receive, and subsequently maintain, on-campus parking privileges.
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In order to determine the legality of high school drug-testing programs, the
Supreme Court of the United States has established a balancing test to be applied in
every case. Through a strict application of the Court’s balancing test, the Groveport
Madison drug-testing program is likely to be upheld. However, this article has set
forth several public policy considerations that should be addressed when applying
the relevant factors in the test and has argued that, after factoring the public policy
considerations into the test, the balance should weigh against expanding drug-testing
programs to contexts other than those already upheld by the Court. Therefore,
should the Groveport Madison program be challenged in formal litigation, it should
be struck down due to its implication of so many important public policy concerns.
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